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pramāa as valid cognition (samyagjñāna) is cognition causing a person to make an act (pravartaka) on 
the object, namely cognition causing a person to attain (prāpaka) the object, which is equated with 
cognition showing the object of the act and with cognition discriminating the object. On the other hand, 
a result of valid cognition is the function (vyāpāra) of such cognition for causing a person to attain the 
object, which is equated with the fact of showing the object of the act (prav ttiviayapradarśana) and 
with cognition of the object (arthādhigati). 
Secondly, I inquire into the object of the act and the discrimination in view of two kinds of 
objects of direct perception, that is, the object that is directly grasped (grāhya), existing momentarily, 
and the object of judgment (adhyavaseya), having a temporal span. This view is typical of Dharmottara. 
The result shows that the object of both act and discrimination is the object of judgment, which is 
closely related with an achievement of a purpose (arthakriyā). 
Finally, I attempt to demonstrate the position of cognition of the object in the process of direct 
perception, applying the same kind of relation as these two object to that between cognition of the 
object and judgment. In the process of direct perception, non-conceptual direct perception having the 
form of the object matter (ex. the blue) arises at first, and then conceptual cognition arises, which 
judges the precedent direct perception. The fact that the precedent direct perception is of a certain 
object (ex. the blue) is ascertained only if the later conceptual cognition judges it. Therefore, The 
cognition of the object itself exists as non-conceptual, but it is all but conceptual because it is cognition 
of a certain object is ascertained by conceptual cognition. 
 
What is abhāvapramā in the demonstration of svaprakāśa in the 
Advaitavedānta school?: In contrast to viparyaya 
MANABE Tomohiro  
I previously contributed an article about the demonstration of vijñāna svaprakāśatā seen in the 
Khaanakhaakhādya (Kh), which was written to Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) of the Advaitavedānta school. In 
that case, evidence is found in the Kh for the conception of the right cognition of negation 
(vyatirekapramā), which is hardly found in other texts of the Advaitavedānta school, so I contributed 
the article about this conception. In that article, it becomes clear that this conception is the right 
cognition of nonexistence of cognition (abhāvapramā) and possesses the problem of whether it is 
svaprakāśa or not. But I could not examine the similarities and differences between abhāvapramā with 
an error (viparyaya) and abhāvapramā, so I consider the difference between abhāvapramā and 
viparyaya in this article. 
English summary 
84 
 
Moreover, I clarify the role abhāvapramā plays in svaprakāśa of the Advaitavedānta school by 
examining Citsukha’s (ca. 13th) Tattvapradīpikā (TP). Similar to the Kh, this work discusses 
abhāvapramā and viparyaya as evidence of vijñāna svaprakāśatā.  By examining Kh and TP, it 
becomes clear that there are parallel arguments in both texts and that in this debate viparyaya and 
abhāvapramā (vyatirekapramā, viparītapramā) are consistent with each other. As a result, I conclude 
that the difference between abhāvapramā and viparyaya is as follows. 
First, if cognition is present and if it is known correctly, then correct knowledge occurs. However, 
if viparyaya occurs when that cognition is not accurately known, then this viparyaya is knowledge that 
is incorrectly recognized as opposed to the content of cognition. On the other hand, when abhāvapramā 
occurs it is unrelated to the content of recognition and cognition that such cognition itself does not exist 
occurs. As described above, the difference between abhāvapramā and viparyaya is whether there is the 
recognition that the content of cognition is incorrect in regards to the cognition of the object, or whether 
it is incorrect knowledge about the presence or absence of cognition.  
As a result of the above considerations, it becomes clear that abhāvapramā in the demonstration 
of svaprakāśa in the Advaitavedānta school is, unlike viparyaya that is related to the recognizing of 
content, the knowledge related to the presence or absence of cognition of the object. Then,  
abhāvapramā is the correct knowledge of the absence of the cognition of subject, but by saying that 
abhāvapramā does not exist, scholars of the Advaitavedānta school tried to claim that cognition that is 
the subject is always present. 
 
Dharmakīrti's interpretation of nigrahasthāna (2): 
On ado
odbhāvana 
SASAKI Ryo 
Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660) defined "the condition of defeat" (nigrahasthāna) — a traditional 
concept in the art of debate — from a totally new viewpoint in his work Vādanyāya (VN). He divided it 
into asādhanā!gavacana, the condition of defeat for proponents, and adoodbhāvana, the condition of 
defeat for opponents. This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when 
his behavior corresponds to asādhanā!gavacana and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his 
behavior corresponds to adoodbhāvana, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, 
based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong. 
The conditions of victory or defeat in debate in the VN should not be clarified only through an 
analysis of asādhanā!gavacana and adoodbhāvana. We have to disentangle the relationship between 
